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CHAPTER 9 
Bargaining and Influence in Conflict Situations 
EDWARD J. LAWLER 
REBECCA FORD 
Bargaining subsumes a diverse range of phe-
nomena approached by a variety of academic 
disciplines. Economists have studied how labor-
management bargaining affects wage rates (Cham-
berlain 1955; Dunlop 1950; Young 1975; Zeuthen 
1930); mathematicians and game theorists have 
tried to find predictive (or prescriptive) mathemati-
cal solutions to explain how actors will "split the 
difference" when they bargain (Harsanyi 1977; 
Luce and Raiffa 1957); political scientists have 
studied international alliances, the onset of wars, 
and deterrence processes (Morgan 1977; Schelling 
1960); and social psychologists have examined the 
influence tactics of actors in conflict and bargain-
ing (Deutsch 1969; Pruitt 1981; Rubin and Brown 
1975). Sociologists, only recently interested in bar-
gaining, bring an emphasis on structure (power) 
and process (tactics) in bargaining (e.g., Bacharach 
and Lawler 1981; Cook and Emerson 1978; Pat-
chen 1988; Strauss 1978). 
This chapter examines bargaining as an influ-
ence process through which actors attempt to re-
solve a social conflict. Conflict occurs when two or 
more interdependent actors have incompatible pre-
ferences and perceive or anticipate resistance from 
each other (Blalock 1989; Kriesberg 1982). Bar-
gaining is a basic form of goal-directed action 
that involves both intentions to influence and ef-
forts by each actor to carry out these intentions. 
Tactics are verbal and/or nonverbal actions de-
signed to maneuver oneself into a favorable posi-
tion vis-a-vis another or to reach some accommo-
dation. Our treatment of bargaining subsumes the 
concept of "negotiation" (see Morley and Stephen-
son 1977).1 
This chapter focuses on social psychological 
theory and research on bargaining and adopts a 
sociological perspective. We attempt a conceptual 
synthesis rather than a thorough review, and thus 
selectively emphasize fundamental theoretical ideas 
and classic empirical work. Our sociological per-
spective is captured by five basic assumptions. 
(1) Conflict has a social structural foundation, 
meaning that actors in a bargaining situation tend 
to occupy social positions with different interests. 
Conflicts are likely to emerge time and time again, 
regardless of who occupies these positions, as long 
as the social structure remains unchanged (Lawler 
1992). (2) Incentives, utilities, or payoffs that stim-
ulate bargaining are embedded in social structures 
allocating power and status across social positions 
and roles. Some structures create incentives for 
actors to accommodate and some create incentives 
to gain advantage. (3) Actors are at best "bound-
edly rational," because they not only face substan-
tial ambiguity and uncertainty about each other's 
intentions but also have incentives to withhold in-
formation, bluff, and otherwise manipulate each 
other's cognitions and behavior. (4) Social interac-
tion in the bargaining process is "tactical action." 
Tactics are time-bound patterns of action that can 
be directed at various goals, such as to punish the 
other, test the other's resolve, and gain informa-
tion (Lawler 1992; Pruitt 1981; Strauss 1978). 
Actors imperfectly assemble their tactics into stra-
tegies. (5) The bargaining process consists of tacti-
cal-countertactical patterns of action that produce 
emergent effects on the results of bargaining (Bach-
arach and Lawler 1981). The social structure shapes 
actors' definitions of the bargaining context, but 
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the bargaining process takes on a "life of its own" 
once initiated. 
Bargaining tends to occur under two condi-
tions. First, two or more actors (individuals, groups, 
organizations) have a conflict of interest, manifest 
in expected or actual negative acts toward one an-
other (Blalock 1989). The negative acts may range 
from snide comments among friends to military 
force among nations. Second, actors wish to influ-
ence each other, either to get their own way or, 
failing this, to reach a mutual accommodation. Get-
ting their own way could involve what movie to 
attend on a Friday night or how member nations are 
to interpret a rule of the European Economic Com-
munity. Mutual accommodation could involve opt-
ing for everybody's second choice among movie 
options or interpreting a given rule of the European 
Economic Community so that all members suffer 
an equal decrement in national autonomy. Structur-
ally, bargaining presupposes a relationship in 
which actors are at least minimally interdependent 
on one another. If interdependence between actors 
is so low that each can readily avoid the other, or if 
they prefer other relationships anyway, a conflict 
will likely trigger a breakdown of the relationship 
prior to any bargaining. The structure of interde-
pendence produces sufficient incentives to bargain 
when the costs of continuing the conflict are 
greater than the costs to actors of compromise 
agreements involving something less than their most 
preferred solution (Raiffa 1982). 
When bargaining occurs, the mutual efforts of 
actors to influence one another other results in a 
joint (collective) product (Bacharach and Lawler 
1981; Walton and McKersie 1965). One aspect of 
this joint product is simply whether conflict resolu-
tion (agreement) occurs or not; another is the exact 
nature of the agreement reached. These are distin-
guishable dependent variables that receive varied 
emphasis in the bargaining literature. In game theo-
retical work, for example, the likelihood of agree-
ment typically is assumed to be 100 percent (given 
rational actors) and the focus is the nature of the 
agreement (Luce and Raiffa 1957; Rapoport 1966). 
In social psychological and sociological work, con-
flict resolution is assumed to be more highly prob-
lematic, so greater attention is given to the struc-
tural and processual conditions likely to promote 
or inhibit agreements (Bacharach and Lawler 
1981; Blalock 1989; Cook and Emerson 1978; Da-
hrendorf 1959; Lawler 1992; Rubin and Brown 
1975; Strauss 1978). 
This chapter is organized around a conceptual 
framework that distinguishes basic types of bar-
gaining contexts. We begin by introducing the 
framework and then present an overview of and 
analyze theoretical and empirical work on each 
type of bargaining context. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Conceptualizing the varied contexts of bargaining 
is useful, heuristically, to understand the structural 
constraints and opportunities in different bargain-
ing settings. Two contrasts form the foundation for 
a fourfold typology of bargaining contexts (see 
Bacharach and Lawler 1980 for an earlier version): 
tacit versus explicit, and distributive versus inte-
grative bargaining. The first refers to the nature and 
use of verbal communication between actors 
(Schelling 1960) and the second to the potential for 
actors to increase their joint benefit from conflict 
resolution (Pruitt 1981; Walton and McKersie 
1965). Our theoretical strategy is to abstract the 
prototypical features of diverse bargaining con-
texts by sharpening and interrelating these con-
trasts.2 
Tacit versus Explicit Bargaining 
Schelling (1960) first introduced and developed 
the distinction between tacit and explicit bargain-
ing. Tacit bargaining occurs when interdependent 
actors perceive a conflict and anticipate each other's 
behavior without open communication. The moves 
and countermoves tend to be nonverbal and to 
occur at a distance, because the social structure 
obstructs opportunities to communicate, makes ex-
plicit bargaining normatively inappropriate, or fos-
ters too much distrust for actors to use existing 
channels of communication to deal with conflict 
openly and constructively. 
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The task actors face in tacit bargaining de-
pends on the priority they give to the cooperative or 
competitive sides of the mixed-motive dilemma. If 
cooperation is stressed, the dilemma is how to reach 
a jointly beneficial result without overtly commu-
nicating. For example, two shoppers who become 
separated from one another in a busy mall must 
tacitly coordinate their efforts to reunite (Schelling 
1960). If competition is emphasized, tacit bargain-
ing involves tactical efforts to outmaneuver the 
other and achieve an advantage, or at least avoid a 
disadvantage. Examples include a nation that pre-
emptively occupies a strategic location in an inter-
national conflict, a motorist who swerves in front 
of another to be the first through an intersection, 
and a sales manager who proposes an organiza-
tional policy that favors sales over production. 
Explicit bargaining differs from tacit bargain-
ing in three primary respects (Bacharach and 
Lawler 1980, 108-116). First, actors acknowledge 
a conflict and consent to bargain. Second, lines of 
communication are direct, verbal, and open enough 
to permit a series of offers and counteroffers, that 
is, provisional compromises that are not fixed until 
both agree. Third, the actors perceive a potential 
for compromise—solutions that give each party 
benefits greater than those derived from nonagree-
ment. The task is to converge on an explicit and 
often formal agreement. These three properties of 
explicit bargaining contexts are manifest in inter-
national peace treaties, corporate mergers, labor-
management wage negotiations, prenuptial agree-
ments, and even child custody settlements. 
Distributive versus Integrative Bargaining 
The contrast between distributive and integrative 
bargaining concerns the nature of the issues under 
negotiation. An issue is defined as a single dimen-
sion with a range of possible solutions that produce 
payoffs for each actor. The range of possible solu-
tions includes a subset referred to as the "contract 
zone," which provides each actor payoffs better 
than nonagreement and constitutes the incentive to 
bargain in the first place. The ends of the contract 
zone are anchored by each actor's "resistance 
points," such as the highest wage an organization 
will pay versus the lowest wage a union will accept 
(Walton and McKersie 1965). 
In their classic statement, Walton and McKer-
sie (1965) define distributive bargaining in terms 
of issues that involve a fixed amount of benefit to 
divide and integrative bargaining in terms of vari-
able-sum issues. In distributive bargaining over 
wages, for example, an increase in wage rates for 
labor entails a gain for labor and a cost to manage-
ment. This zero-sum aspect of the issue exerts pres-
sure toward competition and hostility, whereas the 
opportunity costs associated with nonagreement 
exert pressure toward cooperation and conciliation 
(Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Luce and Raiffa 
1957; Walton and McKersie 1965). These compet-
ing pressures make the overall situation a classic 
mixed-motive one; that is both incentives to com-
pete and incentives to cooperate are present. Each 
actor wants an agreement (the incentive to cooper-
ate), but each also wants an agreement giving them 
as much of the fixed benefit as possible (the incen-
tive to compete). 
In integrative bargaining, some agreements 
produce more total benefit than others, and there is 
therefore a potential for joint problem solving. The 
prototypical integrative bargaining context is one 
in which there are multiple issues under negotia-
tion and bargainers assign complementary priori-
ties to them. Take the example of a union and 
management negotiating a wage and fringe bene-
fits package. If the union gives higher priority to 
wages than fringe benefits while management 
gives higher priority to fringe benefits, then sepa-
rate "split-the-difference" solutions on each issue 
produce less benefit for each party than trading off 
a larger wage increase for a less generous fringe 
benefits package. Integrative bargaining contexts 
contain underlying compatible interests or goals 
that enable actors to develop solutions that increase 
their joint benefit beyond what "split-difference 
agreements" would provide (Pruitt 1981; Walton 
and McKersie 1965). 
Bargainers typically do not have perfect infor-
mation about the other's payoffs and priorities, so 
they often approach integrative contexts as if the 
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issues were distributive (Neale and Bazerman 
1991). For integrative issues to promote conflict 
resolution, the actors must perceive the structural 
conditions that create an underlying common inter-
est. Thus, research on integrative bargaining fo-
cuses on the conditions giving rise to such percep-
tions (Neale and Bazerman 1991). The task in 
integrative bargaining is for actors to discover how 
to integrate their interests by, for example, ex-
changing information about their preferences (e.g., 
Pruitt 1981). 
A Typology 
Cross-classifying tacit-explicit and distributive-
integrative dimensions yields a two-by-two typo-
logy of bargaining contexts (Bacharach and Lawler 
1980). This typology is important for a number of 
reasons. It captures some key differences of focus 
across different theoretical traditions in sociology. 
Symbolic interactionist theories of identity and "ne-
gotiated order" analyze the subtle ways actors de-
velop complementary, mutually shared self-other 
definitions, and this implies a concern with tacit-
integrative bargaining (Strauss 1978). Social ex-
change theories of power analyze how structural 
power positions affect bargaining process and out-
comes, focusing primarily on explicit-distributive 
bargaining (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Cook and 
Emerson 1978; Heckathorn 1983; Lawler 1992; 
Markovsky, Wilier, and Patton 1988).3 Economic 
models also emphasize explicit-distributive con-
texts (e.g., Chamberlin 1955; Zeuthen 1930). Cog-
nitive theories focus on explicit-integrative bar-
gaining and analyze how decision heuristics and 
biases shape actors' definitions of and response to 
issues and payoff structures (Neale and Bazerman 
1991; Pruitt 1981). Finally, game theories of stra-
tegic interaction in choice matrices reveal princi-
ples of special relevance to tacit-distributive bar-
gaining (Harsanyi 1977; Luce and Raiffa 1957; 
Rapoport 1966).4 
The typology also has implications for the 
type of setting—experimental or natural—appro-
priate to test or apply a theory. A theory directed at 
explicit-distributive bargaining would require a 
somewhat different context than one directed at 
explicit-integrative or tacit-distributive bargaining. 
In fact, different research traditions tend to use 
different experimental settings tied to the particular 
conditions required for a theoretical approach, but 
little effort has been made to conceptualize these 
different settings abstractly. We contend that the 
different experimental settings found in the bar-
gaining literature create distinct social contexts 
that correspond to one of the above types and that 
these represent unrecognized and unspecified as-
sumptions about social context implied by various 
research traditions. 
A similar point is made by Stryker (1977), 
who suggests more generally that social psycho-
logical researchers are not sensitive enough to the 
implicit social structures and definitions of the 
situation they create in the laboratory. One implica-
tion for bargaining is that a matrix game is likely to 
be a different social context than other experimen-
tal games, therefore creating different definitions 
of the situation. In research using matrix games, 
choices are dichotomous and made simultaneously 
without verbal communication, which reflects ma-
jor features of a tacit-distributive context. In a 
buyer-seller game (bilateral monopoly), actors 
have a wide range of possible compromise solu-
tions and can make offers and counteroffers across 
a number of bargaining rounds, which reflects ma-
jor features of explicit-distributive bargaining. Such 
contexts are likely to foster different definitions of 
the situation and lead to different kinds of tactical 
action (Morley and Stephenson 1977; Nemeth 1970; 
Stryker 1977). 
Of the four types of bargaining, tacit-distributive 
bargaining is the most conflictual: there are funda-
mental incompatibilities in actors' goals; there are 
few viable compromise solutions; and tactical op-
tions are highly constrained. Explicit-distributive 
bargaining conforms to most common-sense con-
ceptions of bargaining. The bargaining is mutually 
recognized, the issues involve a fixed sum, and a 
wide range of possible solutions or compromises 
allow an offer-counteroffer sequence. A wider 
range of solutions expands the range of tactical 
options (e.g., concession patterns). 
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In tacit-integrative bargaining, actors have un-
derlying compatible goals, a variable sum issue, 
and constraints on their verbal communication that 
limit tactical options. They coordinate their behav-
ior without appearing to negotiate or having to 
acknowledge the conflict or define the relationship 
in bargaining terms. Much of the bargaining in 
organizations takes this subtle, informal, and coop-
erative form (Bacharach and Lawler 1980). Ex-
plicit-integrative bargaining, in contrast, combines 
a mutually acknowledged conflict with underlying 
common interests and a problem-solving approach. 
There are a range of possible issues and solutions 
from which actors overtly construct integrative so-
lutions that enhance the joint sum of benefits. In 
the following sections, we subsume disparate re-
search traditions under the four types of bargaining 
context. 
TACIT-DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING 
We argue that social psychological research on ma-
trix games essentially involves a tacit-distributive 
context. The standard matrix game used in research 
consists of two actors, who may choose to compete 
or cooperate, and a payoff structure (the matrix). 
Each actor's payoffs are contingent on both his/her 
own and the other's choice (Rapoport 1966); the 
contingent nature of the payoffs is the source of 
their interdependence. In addition, communication 
opportunities are limited, and the meaning of con-
cession and compromise is unclear in these set-
tings, which gives the issue a "win-lose" appear-
ance (Boyle and Lawler 1991; Nemeth 1972). Actors 
do not necessarily define their action as bargaining, 
and conflict resolution involves implicit coordina-
tion. 
It is important to emphasize that matrix games 
have been used as both generalized analytic de-
vices and concrete research settings. As analytic 
devices, they provide insightful, fundamental ideas 
about the logic of conflict underlying all four types 
of bargaining context (e.g., Hamburger 1979; Ra-
poport 1966). In this section, we deal only with their 
use as experimental research settings (see Pruitt 
1981; Rubin and Brown 1975 for extensive reviews). 
Of innumerable types of choice matrices (e.g., Ham-
burger 1979), two have been particularly prominent 
in research by social psychologists—the prisoner's 
dilemma and chicken games. We use these to ex-
amine the dynamics of tacit-distributive contexts. 
Abstract examples of a prisoner dilemma and 
chicken payoff structures are shown in Figure 9.1. 
Assuming that each actor wants to maximize 
his/her own payoff and is making simultaneous 
choices to cooperate or compete, each matrix cre-
ates a different problem for actors. In the prisoner's 
dilemma, each individual has an incentive to 
choose the competitive choice, because he/she re-
ceives more from competition than from coopera-
tion regardless of what the other person does—in 
Figure 9.1, actor A receives ten instead of three (if 
B cooperates) and zero instead of minus five units 
of payoff (if B competes). This is called a "domi-
nant strategy," a choice that gives an actor more 
payoff regardless of what the other does (Rapoport 
1966). As a dominant strategy, competition is the 
rational choice for each individual. However, if 
both actors adopt this choice in a prisoner's di-
lemma, the result is that they get less than they 
would if they both cooperated (see chapter 12 for 
further discussion of this paradox). Furthermore, 
once they start choosing competitive lines of be-
havior, it is quite difficult for them to arrive at a 
tacit agreement to cooperate mutually, because nei-
ther will trust the other to keep such a tacit agree-
ment. Conflict resolution is quite difficult to ac-
complish in a prisoner's dilemma. 
A chicken setting does not contain a dominant 
strategy, as the example in Figure 9.1 illustrates. 
Actor A gets more from competition only if the 
other cooperates (ten versus three units of payoff); 
if the other competes, A gets more from cooperat-
ing rather than competing (zero versus minus five 
units of payoff). In addition, if both actors adopt 
the competitive choice, each receives his/her worst 
payoff; therefore, the payoff structure involves 
stronger incentives to resolve the conflict than in a 
prisoner's dilemma. Note that in a prisoner di-
lemma structure, the payoff from mutual competi-
tion is still better than the payoff from cooperating 
while the other competes. 
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PRISONER'S DILEMMA CHICKEN STRUCTURE 
ACTOR A 
Cooperate Compete 
ACTOR B 
ACTOR A 
Cooperate Compete 
Cooperate 
Compete 
3 
10 
3 
-5 
-5 
0 
10 
0 
ACTOR B 
Cooperate 
Compete 
3 
10 
3 
0 
0 
-5 
10 
-5 
FIGURE 9.1 Prisoner's dilemma and chicken game matrices. Numbers in each cell are units of payoff 
resulting from the conjoint choices of each actor. The numbers in the upper right positions are A's payoffs 
and those below are B's payoffs. 
An arms race between two nations typically 
involves a prisoner's dilemma structure. The coop-
erative choice for each is to disarm; the competi-
tive choice to arm. In the arms race, the worst result 
for each actor occurs if they cooperate (disarm) 
while the other competes (arm). Continuing to 
compete (arm) is better than risking unreciprocated 
disarmament. Given the underlying prisoner's di-
lemma structure, arms races are difficult to stop. 
However, they sometimes continue for long peri-
ods of time without producing actual hostilities, 
because the decision to start or not start a war is 
embedded in a chicken structure. This is true if 
the nations suffer their worst payoffs when both 
choose mutual competition (war). Overall, chicken 
structures should produce more cooperative action, 
whatever its specific form, than a prisoner's di-
lemma structure. Classic comparisons of prisoner's 
dilemma and chicken structures by Rapoport and 
Chammah (1965) support this general conclusion. 
Competition is clearly and unequivocally the 
rational choice in a single-play (one choice or one 
trial) prisoner's dilemma. Empirical research con-
firms that a large proportion of persons in an ex-
perimentally created, one-trial prisoner's dilemma 
choose the competitive option (Murnighan and Roth 
1978). Repeated (iterative) prisoner dilemmas are 
more interesting, however, because most conflicts 
occur in continuing social relationships. Competi-
tion typically remains the "rational" choice (i.e., 
dominant strategy) in ongoing relations of a pris-
oner's dilemma form, but theorists such as Luce 
and Raiffa (1957) and Axelrod (1984) suggest that 
over time actors develop tacit agreements to coop-
erate, thereby avoiding the costs of continued 
mutual competition. In an ongoing relationship, 
choices at one point have as one purpose influenc-
ing the subsequent or later choices of the other. 
However, research suggests while rates of co-
operation may increase with repeated play over 
time, the rate of cooperation does not approach 100 
percent; in fact, there is often a higher rate of 
competitive than cooperative behavior at the end of 
studies with one hundred to two hundred repeated 
plays of the same payoff structure (Gallo and Mc-
Clintock 1965; Nemeth 1970; Rapoport and Cham-
mah 1965). An interesting and important reason is 
that parties often have knowledge of when the game 
ends, which produces an infinite regress (Murnig-
han and Roth 1978; Rapoport 1966). If on the last 
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trial there is no chance of influencing future behav-
ior, both realize the competitive choice is most 
profitable, as in a one-choice or one-trial game. As 
long as the outcome of this last trial is known, each 
actor also knows he/she cannot influence future 
behavior on the next-to-last trial, which suggests a 
competitive choice on that trial as well. Since the 
outcome of the second-to-last trial is now known, 
each actor anticipates that his/her choice on the 
third-to-last trial also cannot influence future tri-
als, and so on, until both are led, theoretically, to 
choose competitively on each and every trial (Rapo-
port 1966). In support, Murnighan and Roth (1978) 
found that parties are more cooperative if there is a 
high probability the game will continue. 
The Opponent's Strategy 
One of the major topics of research—the use of 
particular strategies to induce more cooperation by 
the other—results from the fact that cooperation 
doesn't emerge naturally in a prisoner's dilemma. 
A two-by-two matrix (two actors, two choice op-
tions) allows two fundamental strategies with a 
number of variants: (1) an unconditional strategy, 
involving consistent cooperation or competition, 
not contingent on the opponent's behavior; and 
(2) a conditional strategy, involving competition or 
cooperation contingent on the opponent's behavior. 
Early research on the prisoner's dilemma indicated 
that conditional strategies of one sort or another 
produce more cooperation than unconditional co-
operation or competition (e.g., Oskamp 1971; Ser-
mat 1964; Solomon 1960). A conditional strategy 
is relatively successful because it rewards the other 
for cooperating and retaliates in response to com-
petition. Unconditional competition engenders a 
"lock-in" of mutual conflict, while unconditional 
cooperation produces exploitation of those who 
use it (e.g., Solomon 1960). 
Applied to a chicken structure, however, un-
conditional competition puts the opponent in the 
bind of accepting mutual high costs or lower costs 
that allow the other to do better. In an interesting 
study, Sermat (1964) observed that in a chicken 
game a 100 percent competitive strategy (i.e., com-
petition on all trials) was more effective in eliciting 
cooperation than a 100 percent (unconditional) co-
operative strategy. In a subsequent study, Sermat 
(1967) showed that a chicken structure, compared 
to a prisoner's dilemma, makes actors more re-
sponsive to the opponent. In one condition, sub-
jects were told their opponent could freely play the 
game; in a second condition they (knowingly) 
faced a machine with a preprogrammed strategy. In 
the prisoner's dilemma, the subjects' rate of coop-
eration was unaffected by the kind of opponent, but 
in the chicken structure the type of opponent made 
a significant difference. When facing an opponent 
choosing competition 100 percent of the time, sub-
jects knowingly interacting with the machine made 
more cooperative choices than those interacting 
with the "freely playing" opponent. One interpreta-
tion is that for reasons of face subjects became 
more concerned with preventing the other from 
gaining an advantage when interacting with a real 
other. 
Most research indicates overall that a tit-for-tat 
strategy—reciprocating the choices of the other— 
produces the greatest cooperation by an opponent 
(Marinoff 1992; Oskamp 1971; Rapoport and 
Chammah 1965; Wilson 1971). In a highly influen-
tial analysis of strategies, Axelrod (1984) asked 
scholars of bargaining to submit strategies for a 
series of computer tournaments using a prisoner's 
dilemma. Many of these strategies were highly 
complex variants of conditional cooperation. The 
results showed that the best strategy was a simple 
tit-for-tat one involving a cooperative choice on the 
first trial and reciprocation of the opponent's last 
choice on all subsequent trials. This strategy did 
better than or as well as any other strategy entered 
in the tournaments (Axelrod 1984). Axelrod ex-
plains the success of tit for tat as due to the fact that 
it never provokes an opponent into competition yet 
cannot be taken advantage of, because it always 
reciprocates the opponent's last move and therefore 
punishes unprovoked competition. Because it is a 
simple strategy, tit for tat is easily recognized and 
adapted to by others (Axelrod 1984). 
The tit-for-tat strategy also has several impor-
tant limitations. First, as Axelrod himself points 
CHAPTER 9 Bargaining and Influence in Conflict Situations 243 
out, in a multiactor setting tit for tat needs other 
cooperators. A completely hostile environment, 
where everyone chooses competitively all of the 
time, will not be affected by the tit-for-tat strategy. 
In fact, there is evidence that tit for tat is not a very 
robust strategy if any of Axelrod's assumptions are 
relaxed (Hirshleifer and Coll 1988). Second, one 
party may not wish to "learn" to be cooperative, or 
as Blalock (1989) observes, one party may detest 
the other and wish him/her dead. Third, tit for tat 
may create competitive deadlocks. If the first coop-
erative gesture is not reciprocated, it will produce 
an impasse or lock-in of mutual competition 
(Axelrod 1984). Overall, a tit-for-tat strategy may 
be useful only to prevent a lock-in at mutual com-
petition. 
Axelrod's work is directed solely at a pris-
oner's dilemma, but Patchen (1987) suggests two 
reasons why a tit-for-tat strategy should be even 
more effective in a chicken structure. First, B's 
knowledge that A will reciprocate competition ef-
fectively removes B's temptation to compete, be-
cause doing so would result in B receiving his/her 
lowest payoff. Second, since B does not expect A to 
compete, B has little incentive to try to be the first 
to compete. Consistent with our earlier discussion, 
the chicken structure has more built-in push toward 
mutual cooperation, and a tit-for-tat strategy should 
capitalize on this.5 
Conditions for Cooperation 
A tit-for-tat strategy should induce an "expectation 
of cooperation" by the other, which can be inter-
preted in terms of Pruitt and Kimmel's (1977) goals/ 
expectations theory of cooperation. They identify 
two conditions that foster the development of mu-
tual cooperation: (1) each actor adopts a goal of 
establishing or maintaining mutual cooperation; and 
(2) each expects the other to engage in cooperation 
in response to his/her cooperation. Goals of coop-
eration ostensibly emerge if people take a longer-
term view of the relationship, perceive that they are 
highly dependent on the other, and believe each 
other are not likely to cooperate unilaterally. In 
general, a chicken structure should be more likely 
than a prisoner's dilemma to produce a goal of mutual 
cooperation, simply because mutual competition 
produces the worst payoffs. Mutual competition in 
a prisoner's dilemma may produce a goal of mutual 
cooperation, but acting on that goal is more diffi-
cult because to reach it actors have to risk receiving 
their worst possible payoffs, those from cooperat-
ing when the other competes. This is the problem 
Axelrod's tit-for-tat strategy addresses. 
However, Axelrod's (1984) solution to the 
prisoner's dilemma neglects an important implica-
tion of the goal criterion—that each actor perceives 
the other's cooperative behavior as reflecting a 
goal of mutual cooperation. A pattern of mutual 
cooperation is likely to be unstable unless each 
actor comes to believe that the other also has a goal 
of mutual cooperation. This is important to "trust," 
a problem that is particularly severe when actors 
establish a lock-in of mutual competition. 
Such an impasse might be broken by applying 
Osgood's (1962) idea of graduated and recipro-
cated initiatives in tension reduction (GRIT strat-
egy) (Lindskold 1978). Osgood proposes that if 
one actor makes a series of small, unilateral ges-
tures without an expectation of immediate reci-
procity, the other will come to reciprocate concili-
atory behavior. A GRIT strategy goes beyond tit for 
tat by making a unilateral switch to cooperation in 
the context of an extended pattern of mutual com-
petition. Along with such a switch, the strategy 
involves verbal affirmations of conciliatory intent. 
Presumably, such a strategy promotes trust, or ex-
pectations of cooperation (Pruitt 1981), and treats a 
problem that cannot be addressed by Axelrod's 
tit-for-tat strategy. 
Several studies have explored the effectiveness 
of GRIT strategy at eliciting cooperation. Lindskold 
and Collins (1978) report that GRIT elicited more 
cooperation than tit for tat and a 50 percent coop-
eration control condition. Furthermore, Lindskold 
(1978) analyzed GRIT's effectiveness against op-
ponents classified as either cooperators or competi-
tors and found that it was equally effective with 
both. Overall, it appears that unilateral gestures are 
potentially effective to resolve an impasse in tacit-
distributive bargaining, but these initiatives must 
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meet certain conditions or users risk exploitation 
(see Boyle and Lawler 1991; Lindskold 1978). 
To conclude, in tacit-distributive bargaining, 
social structures create incompatible goals and 
limit the degree to which actors are able or willing 
to communicate with each other overtly and explic-
itly about the conflict. Each independently and si-
multaneously pursues his/her own interests and 
adopts cooperative or competitive lines of action. 
The choices of action are based on incentives cre-
ated and maintained by the social structure, and 
individuals' choices produce collective results that 
are often unintended. Avoiding a mutually destruc-
tive pattern of mutual conflict and reaching mutual 
cooperation requires tacit coordination. As a whole: 
(1) chicken structures are more likely to produce 
such coordination than prisoner's dilemma struc-
tures; (2) tit for tat is the most promising interper-
sonal strategy for promoting cooperation by others; 
and (3) unilateral initiatives, including noncontin-
gent cooperation, can mitigate conflict when a lock-in 
of mutual competition occurs. 
TACIT-INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING 
In tacit-integrative bargaining, actors do not ac-
knowledge a conflict but can coordinate their be-
havior because of underlying common interests. In 
many instances, the structure and norms of the 
relation or the larger group discourage or even 
prohibit the actors from acknowledging the con-
flict. A perception of common interest means that 
actors have a "dual concern" for self's and other's 
outcomes (Blake and Mouton 1979; Pruitt 1983). 
Tacit-integrative, as opposed to tacit-distribu-
tive, contexts inherently satisfy one of the conditions 
for cooperation identified by Pruitt's goals/expec-
tations theory—each actor already has a goal of mu-
tual cooperation. The dilemma actors face is that 
they don't know whether joint benefit is a goal for 
the other, making trust a problem. Actors can't be 
certain, for example, that they define their relation-
ship or the issues at hand similarly, and these sort 
of judgments require significant "cognitive work." 
Three specific types of tacit-integrative set-
tings can be distinguished: (1) actors are unable to 
communicate either verbally or nonverbally (i.e., 
they are completely out of contact); (2) actors are 
unable to communicate verbally, but they can ob-
serve and interpret each other's behavior; (3) actors 
communicate verbally and nonverbally but fail to 
(or cannot) talk about the underlying conflict or 
disagreement. Structural constraints on actors' pat-
terns or forms of communication could be due to 
geographical distance, cultural barriers (e.g., lan-
guage), different knowledge bases (e.g., training, 
expertise), or divergent definitions of the situation 
based on positions in a larger structure (e.g., status, 
authority). Related constraints on their propensity 
to communicate about the conflict could be based 
on interpersonal distrust or collective norms that 
discourage definitions of group relations as bar-
gaining. Tacit-integrative bargaining is particularly 
common in informal organizations and groups be-
cause it serves to emphasize collective purposes, 
keep conflict latent, and enable people with con-
flicting interests to "get the work done" in relative 
harmony. 
There is no systematic, cumulative body of 
theory and research on tacit-integrative bargaining 
contexts, although instances of such bargaining are 
common, everyday experiences in organizations 
(Bacharach and Lawler 1980). One can never-
theless extrapolate from some tacit-distributive re-
search, because the "solutions" for tacit-integrative 
bargaining are likely to be the most cooperatively-
oriented ones in tacit-distributive bargaining. In 
particular, unilateral gestures or "testing the wa-
ters" (Ward 1989) should be a prime way for actors 
in tacit-integrative bargaining to communicate and 
affirm their goals of mutual accommodation. In 
a tacit-integrative context, unconditional (100 per-
cent) cooperation by one actor should generate recip-
rocal cooperation without the safeguards against 
exploitation needed in tacit-distributive contexts 
(Axelrod 1984; Lindskold 1978; Osgood 1962). 
Schelling's (1960) analysis of the role of 
"prominent" solutions adds to our understanding of 
conflict resolution in tacit-integrative contexts. A 
prominent solution is conspicuous in some way, so 
that both actors independently conclude that it is 
the most likely solution (Pruitt 1981; Schelling 
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1960). Solutions such as midpoints of issue con-
tinua or equal trades of complementary benefits 
often have prominence. Actors arrive at prominent 
solutions by taking the other's role, so familiarity 
with the other actor or the situation increases the 
success of settling on a prominent solution. Avail-
able research suggests, for example, that promi-
nence may stem from perceptual salience (e.g., 
size, centrality, order), normative standards (e.g., 
distributive justice), or interpretation of the other's 
likely intentions (Murnighan 1991; Pruitt 1981). 
Actors also may converge on a single solution, 
even without much knowledge of the other or any 
capability to communicate. 
It is important to emphasize that a prominent 
solution channels behavior only to the extent that it 
produces shared expectations perceived as shared 
by the actors themselves. Where actors cannot ver-
bally or nonverbally communicate, the expecta-
tions are based solely on what each can assume 
about the other, and they are unable to validate 
their expectations until the desired outcome occurs 
or fails to occur at the appropriate time or place. If 
actors can monitor the other's behavior nonver-
bally, they can "test" their expectations along the 
way and can send signals if one gets off-track. For 
example, pedestrians and motorists can generally 
coordinate their behavior so that both get through 
an intersection. If one gets off-track, they can re-
align their actions by observing facial expressions 
and other nonverbal behaviors (e.g., hand gestures) 
(Couch 1979; Garfinkel 1964). 
If actors are engaged in verbal interaction, 
their larger relationship expands opportunities for 
coordination with the other. Stein (1967) describes 
a "game" that takes place between doctors and 
nurses. The primary goal of this game is to avoid 
open conflict over patient treatment through a sub-
tle negotiation process in which nurses make rec-
ommendations to doctors without appearing to do 
so and physicians accept these recommendations 
without appearing to do. This requires careful mon-
itoring of the other's nonverbal and verbal commu-
nications. Success at this game provides rewards to 
both "players." The doctor can use the nurse's ex-
pertise and the nurse gains self-esteem and profes-
sional satisfaction. The "negotiated order" perspec-
tive in symbolic interaction theory (Strauss 1978) 
suggests the sort of social processes underlying 
such tacit coordination (Couch 1979; Strauss 1978). 
To conclude, tacit-integrative bargaining oc-
curs in social structures that create incentives for 
mutual cooperation but discourage explicit bar-
gaining by blocking opportunities for open com-
munication or by defining explicit bargaining as 
normatively inappropriate. The integrative side of 
a tacit-integrative context creates common inter-
ests, while the tacit side can make it difficult for the 
actors to accomplish their objectives. However, all 
things equal, tacit-integrative contexts are more 
likely to produce conflict resolution in the form of 
tacit coordination than tacit-distributive ones. While 
actors may misread the each other's intentions or 
goals, as long as each believes the other also per-
ceives common interests and has a goal of mutual 
cooperation, unilateral actions are less risky and 
settling on prominent solutions is more feasible. 
EXPLICIT-DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING 
A bilateral monopoly game (Siegel and Fouraker 
1960) is the laboratory prototype of an explicit-
distributive bargaining context. Actors are buyers 
or sellers negotiating the price of a commodity; 
they consensually define their interaction as bar-
gaining; there is a wide range of possible solutions 
(prices); and they make offers and counteroffers 
over time to reach an agreement. Each perceives an 
incentive to reach an agreement—the payoffs are 
higher from agreement than nonagreement—but 
each also wants an agreement favorable to his/her 
own interests. 
A major contribution of sociologists and social 
psychologists to the literature on bargaining is to 
pick up where economists and game theorists tend 
to leave off, by relaxing some highly stringent 
assumptions and focusing on the process of explicit 
bargaining (e.g., Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Cook 
et al. 1983; Heckathorn 1983; Hegtvedt and Cook 
1987; Wilier, Markovsky, and Patton 1989). The 
result is that bargaining tactics (e.g., toughness), 
structurally based power relations, perceptions of 
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power, and impression management become cen-
tral to explanations of bargaining process. Two 
classes of tactics have received substantial atten-
tion: concession tactics (Chertkoff and Esser 1976; 
Murnighan 1991) and coercive tactics (Deutsch 
and Krauss 1962; Lawler 1986; Michener and Co-
hen 1973). Both are tied to essential features of the 
explicit-distributive context, the offer-counteroffer 
sequence. 
Concession Tactics 
Research on concession tactics is generally con-
cerned with how various facets of a bargainer's 
concession behavior—the initial offer, concession 
magnitude, or concession frequency—are related 
to the opponent's concession behavior. Most of this 
research is organized around two somewhat diver-
gent theoretical foci—aspiration levels (Komorita 
and Brenner 1968; Siegel and Fouraker 1960) and 
the norm of reciprocity or fairness (Chertkoff and 
Esser 1976; Gouldner 1960). Level of aspiration 
theory assumes that actors develop target points 
(aspirations) for a solution: the higher their targets 
(aspirations) the less they yield in the bargaining 
(Chertkoff and Esser 1976; Osgood 1962; Siegel 
and Fouraker 1960). Normative theories suggest 
that actors' pursuit of individual gain is con-
strained by norms, such as reciprocity, that they 
invoke in the bargaining: the stronger these norms, 
the more actors yield and, in particular, the more 
responsive they are to the other's yielding (see 
Hegtvedt and Cook 1987 for a recent discussion). 
Toughness versus Softness. As tactics, conces-
sions are important because of the impressions they 
give. Level of aspiration theory stresses the impor-
tance of giving an impression of toughness (or 
avoiding an impression of weakness), whereas nor-
mative theories stress the importance of giving an 
impression of fairness (or avoiding an impression 
of unfairness). Both theoretical traditions assume 
that aspirations and norms are malleable or raa-
nipulable in the bargaining process (i.e., not fixed). 
Further, when these sorts of processes operate, 
game theory predictions for the likelihood and na-
ture of agreement (Nash 1950) will not reliably 
occur, meaning that the variance around predicted 
(determinate) solutions should be larger and nona-
greements more frequent than expected, not be-
cause actors are nonrational but because of their 
interpretation of the situation and the meaning they 
attach to the other's concession behavior (Bac-
harach and Lawler 1981, chap. 1, 6; Bartos 1977). 
Applied to concession tactics in explicit bar-
gaining, level of aspiration and reciprocity theories 
make opposite predictions. Level of aspiration the-
ory indicates that substantial concessions by actor 
A raise actor B's level of aspiration and, therefore, 
reduce B's concessions. The tougher or firmer A's 
concession pattern, the lower B's aspirations and 
the greater B's concessions. Reciprocity theories, 
in contrast, suggest that significant concessions by 
actor A activate a reciprocity norm, which exerts 
subtle pressure on B to make comparable conces-
sions, whereas toughness by A begets toughness by 
B. Thus, tougher concession tactics produce im-
passes and softer ones reciprocal concessions. 
Several studies have tested one or both of 
these theoretical standpoints, with each receiving 
some empirical support. In the initial test of level 
of aspiration, Siegel and Fouraker (1960) found 
that parties with higher aspirations adopted tougher 
concession tactics, which yielded them more pro-
fitable agreements. Also supporting level of aspi-
ration theory, Bartos (1970) found a negative corre-
lation between each actor's toughness (measured 
by average demand), suggesting that a tougher 
stance produced more yielding and a soft stance 
less. However, while toughness produced higher 
payoffs from the bargaining when agreement oc-
curred, it decreased the prospects for reaching 
agreement. 
Like Bartos (1970), Komorita and Brenner 
(1968) found an inverse relationship between the 
concessions of one party and those of the opponent. 
Contrary to the reciprocity notion, they also re-
vealed that a large initial offer at the midpoint of 
the issue continuum, combined with no further 
concessions, produced the least amount of yielding 
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by the opponent. Beginning negotiations with a 
"fair" offer that one expects to settle on was highly 
ineffective, presumably because it increased the 
other's aspirations. These findings dovetail with 
several other studies, indicating that tough initial 
offers produce better outcomes for a bargainer than 
soft initial offers (Benton, Kelley and Liebling 
1972; Chertkoff and Conley 1976; Liebert et al. 
1968; Yukl 1974). In sum, research on initial offers 
shows fairly consistent support for level of aspira-
tion theory. 
Other research indicates that beyond the initial 
period of bargaining, more concession making than 
suggested by level of aspiration theory is necessary 
to prevent an impasse (Chertkoff and Esser 1976; 
Hegtvedt and Cook 1987; Lawler and MacMurray 
1980). Reciprocity theory tends tq receive the 
strongest overall empirical support (Bacharach and 
Lawler 1980, 120-127; Chertkoff and Esser 1976). 
For example, Esser and Komorita (1975) compared 
a concession tactic conceding about 75 percent of 
what the subject concedes to complete (100 per-
cent) reciprocity and found that complete reciproc-
ity produced larger final offers by the subject. 
Hamner (1974) found that following an impasse, a 
100 percent reciprocity tactic produced more con-
cessions than did tougher tactics. The emergence or 
activation of the reciprocity norm is a plausible 
interpretation for these results because the social 
context implicit in explicit bargaining encourages 
parties to respect each other's preferences and to 
search for a mutually acceptable solution. 
Overall, the research points to deficiencies in 
each theoretical standpoint. Level of aspiration the-
ory fails to account for the fact that toughness 
backfires if it fosters impressions of unfairness or 
unreasonableness, and reciprocity fails to account 
for observations that larger concessions often yield 
lower concessions in response (i.e., exploitation). 
Osgood's GRIT theory, however, provides a basis 
for integrating the theories. Temporarily adopting a 
soft concession tactic (i.e., greater than 100 percent 
reciprocity) should elicit reciprocal concessions 
following an impasse. Exploitation will not occur 
because the impasse demonstrates each actor's re-
solve, and once reciprocal concession making 
starts it can escalate gradually and produce quicker, 
more mutually satisfying agreements than other-
wise (Boyle and Lawler 1991). 
To test this idea, Boyle and Lawler (1991) 
induced an impasse by having a programmed 
"other" make no concessions and inflict punitive 
damage during the first five of twenty rounds. Fol-
lowing the impasse, the programmed other either 
made a series of unilateral concessions across five 
rounds or reciprocated (100 percent matching) 
concessions by the subject. The results indicate 
that unilateral initiatives increased the actor's con-
cessions and reduced their use of punitive tactics 
more than reciprocal concession making (Boyle 
and Lawler 1991). These results support the GRIT 
hypothesis. Thus, if initial toughness produces an 
impasse, a series of small unilateral concessions 
can break it. More generally, firm but fair conces-
sion tactics are most effective with or without an 
impasse (Chertkoff and Esser 1976; Lawler and 
MacMurray 1980). 
Explicit negotiations often take place among 
the same actors over time, yet almost all of the 
research on explicit bargaining involves a "one 
shot" negotiation session. In recent work, Lawler 
and Yoon (1993) show how power affects the emer-
gence of a positive relation among actors who ne-
gotiate repeatedly with each other. They had sub-
jects bargain with each other in ten independent 
negotiations. Equal power produced more frequent 
agreements than unequal power, and more frequent 
agreements in turn aroused positive emotions or 
feelings. These emotions lead actors to give each 
other gifts and to stay in their relation despite equal 
or better alternatives. Lawler and Yoon (1993) sug-
gest that a subtle commitment formation process 
often occurs when the same two persons engage in 
explicit bargaining over time, and this has an emo-
tional/affective foundation. 
Power Relations and Toughness. Social ex-
change theory and research suggests the following 
basic conclusions about the impact of power rela-
tions on the use of toughness in explicit bargaining. 
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First, in an unequal power relationship, higher-
power actors are likely to adopt tougher concession 
tactics and lower-power actors softer ones (e.g., 
Cook et al. 1983; Markovsky, Wilier, and Patton 
1988; Michener et al. 1975). Second, unequal-
power relations create more of an obstacle to con-
cession making than equal-power relations, because 
actors tend to dispute the appropriate connection 
between their power differences and their relative 
yielding (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Hegtvedt 
and Cook 1987; Komorita and Chertkoff 1973; 
Lawler 1992; Lawler and Yoon 1993). Third, in an 
equal-power relation, greater total power or mutual 
dependence softens the concession tactics of each 
actor and increases the likelihood of conflict reso-
lution (Lawler 1992; Lawler and Ford 1993).6 (See 
chapter 8 for a discussion of power in exchange 
networks.) 
Coercive Tactics 
Coercive tactics take the form of threats and dam-
age and presuppose a coercive capability anchored 
in actors' positions in a social structure (Lawler 
1992). Threats express intent to do harm and im-
plicitly or explicitly contain an "if-then" contin-
gency (i.e., "If you do X, then I'll do Y") (Deutsch 
1973; Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma 1973). 
These threats can be verbal or nonverbal and vary 
in specificity or clarity about what the target can do 
or not do to avoid actual damage (Schelling 1960). 
Damage tactics actually inflict punishment and 
may follow through on prior threats or constitute 
an implicit threat of future harm (Lawler 1986; 
Schelling 1960; Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma 
1973). In explicit-distributive bargaining, coercive 
tactics are generally used to extract concessions or 
forestall the other's use of coercive tactics. 
Two theory and research traditions—conflict 
spiral and deterrence—make competing predictions 
about when actors use coercive tactics. The conflict 
spiral tradition stems from Deutsch and associates' 
seminal work on threats (Deutsch 1973; Deutsch 
and Krauss 1960, 1962; Krauss and Deutsch 1966), 
and the deterrence tradition in social psychology 
can be traced to Hornstein (1965), Michener and 
Cohen (1973), and a series of studies by Tedeschi 
and associates (Horai and Tedeschi 1969; Tedeschi, 
Schlenker, and Bonoma 1973). 
The basic implication of the spiral tradition is 
that the availability of coercive capabilities leads to 
their use, and use by one actor begets counteruse by 
the other, resulting in a costly use-counteruse spi-
ral. The theoretical rationale is that the mere pres-
ence of a coercive capability creates a temptation to 
use it, while at the same time actors are unlikely to 
yield because of costs associated with loss of face. 
Conflict spiral effects are reported by Deutsch and 
Krauss (1962), who found that bilateral power con-
ditions (where both actors can damage the other's 
outcomes) produced more hostile power use than 
unilateral (only one party has a coercive capability) 
or no power conditions. 
In contrast, the basic implication of the deter-
rence tradition is that actors are unlikely to take 
hostile action against someone with a larger coer-
cive capability because of the retaliation costs the 
other can levy. The more powerful the other be-
comes, the less likely an actor is to initiate coercive 
tactics. This implies that if both actors have large 
coercive capabilities that make threats of reta-
liation credible, then each will use threat and dam-
age tactics less frequently than otherwise (Schel-
ling 1960; Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma 
1973). Tests of this deterrence notion have fo-
cused on conditions of unilateral or bilateral coer-
cive capability. Tedeschi and colleagues (Tedeschi, 
Schlenker, and Bonoma 1973) conducted a large 
number of studies in which a programmed other 
(with a coercive capability) could levy threats and 
punishments of varying magnitude against a sub-
ject without a coercive capability (unilateral condi-
tion). Larger magnitudes of coercive capability by 
the programmed other produced greater compli-
ance on the part of the target (Horai and Tedeschi 
1969; Schlenker et al. 1970; Tedeschi, Schlenker, 
and Bonoma 1973; also see Michener and Cohen 
1973). 
Studies of explicit bargaining find support for 
deterrence notions when both parties have a coer-
cive capability. Hornstein (1965) contrasted low, 
medium, and high levels of equal coercive capabil-
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ity and found that the lowest frequency of threat 
and damage tactics occurred when both parties had 
high levels of power. Bacharach and Lawler (1981, 
chap. 5) corroborate these results, showing that 
larger magnitudes of coercive capability for both 
actors (with equal power held constant) reduced 
the rate of damage tactics by both. The results of 
these studies contradict hypotheses of the conflict 
spiral tradition. 
Lawler (1986) formulated contrasting theories 
designed to explicate and systematize bilateral de-
terrence and conflict spiral notions. The theories 
use slightly different intervening cognitions to ex-
plain how "total power" (the sum of each actor's 
coercive capability) and "relative power" (the de-
gree of power difference between the actors) affect 
the use of coercive tactics in explicit-distributive 
bargaining (Lawler 1986, 1992). Bilateral deter-
rence theory predicts that given equal power, in-
creases in power capability across both actors leads 
both to have higher fear of retaliation and a lower 
expectation of attack, which in turn reduces use of 
coercive tactics. In contrast, conflict spiral theory 
predicts that increases in power for both leads both 
to be more tempted to use power and to develop 
higher expectations of attack, which increases use 
of coercive tactics. 
Bilateral deterrence theory stipulates further 
that unequal power produces more use of coercive 
tactics than equal power, because high- and low-
power actors assess a power difference differently. 
Higher-power actors emphasize the higher costs of 
retaliation, while lower-power actors stress the 
greater expectation of attack. Thus, higher-power 
actors use more coercive tactics because they have 
less to fear, and lower-power actors use more coer-
cive tactics than would be predicted from their 
power position because they expect higher-power 
actors to take coercive measures against them. Bar-
gaining theory and research suggest that expecta-
tions of attack often produce hostile action in ad-
vance of the expectations being fulfilled (Lawler 
1986; Morgan 1977; Schelling 1960; Tedeschi, 
Bonoma, and Novinson 1970). Conflict spiral the-
ory predicts the opposite: higher-power actors re-
spond primarily to reduced expectation of attack 
and use fewer coercive tactics, while lower-power 
actors are less tempted to use coercive tactics. 
Recent research pitting bilateral deterrence 
against conflict spiral predictions supports Law-
ler's (1986) bilateral deterrence formulation. Two 
experiments demonstrated that where both actors 
have greater coercive capability, they use damage 
tactics less frequently (e.g., administering punish-
ments) in explicit-distributive bargaining (Lawler 
and Bacharach 1987; Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 
1988). Also, actors used damage tactics less fre-
quently if they had equal rather than unequal coer-
cive capability, and higher- versus lower-power 
actors did not use damage tactics at different rates. 
Consistent with the theory, those with lower yet 
"significant" absolute power resisted efforts to 
dominate. 
To conclude, explicit-distributive bargaining 
is most likely where social structures create posi-
tions with divergent interests involving fundamen-
tal goal incompatibilities, while also facilitating 
direct efforts to acknowledge and deal with social 
conflict. Actors who occupy such structural posi-
tions aren't able to reconcile their interests, except 
through a process of concession and compromise. 
By tactically using concession and coercive tactics, 
the actors attempt to maximize the other's yielding 
yet reach agreement. Overall, the research on ex-
plicit-distributive contexts suggests that conces-
sion tactics that combine firmness with fairness are 
most effective, and if each has equal or large coer-
cive capabilities the rate of coercive tactics in the 
relation will be lower than otherwise, making con-
flict resolution somewhat easier. 
EXPLICIT-INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING 
Integrative bargaining research assumes a distinc-
tion between "compromise solutions" involving a 
split-the-difference principle and "integrative so-
lutions" based on elements of common interest 
(Neale and Bazerman 1991; Pruitt 1981; Walton 
and McKersie 1965). A compromise solution (split-
ting the difference) involves each actor converging 
on agreements that fall on a fixed contract zone 
bordered by their "most preferred" agreement points. 
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Integrative solutions reshape the contract zone by 
essentially adding net benefits to some or all of the 
possible agreement points via a social exchange 
process. This is possible mainly when an issue can 
be subdivided into distinct components or when 
two or more issues are already on the bargaining 
table (see Murnighan 1991; Neale and Bazerman 
1991; Pruitt 1981; Thompson and Hastie 1990). 
Explicit-integrative bargaining implies a social 
context where actors have common interests or 
goals based on common organizational member-
ships but also find themselves in conflict based on 
the positions they occupy in the larger structure. 
The conflict is likely to be over means rather than 
fundamental goals. 
To illustrate, consider Follet's (1940) example 
of two actors (A and B) who both want an orange, 
but have only one available. Each would like to 
have the entire orange, but given that this is not 
feasible the obvious compromise is to cut the or-
ange in half. In the course of argument, however, 
they realize that they give priority to different parts 
of the orange. A wants the juice more than the peel, 
B wants the peel more than the juice. The integra-
tive solution is to give A all of the juice and B all of 
the peel; that is, each gives up what they value least 
in exchange for what they value most. Notice that 
splitting the difference (i.e., the orange) would lead 
to a suboptimal solution. The actors in this example 
essentially decompose a distributive issue into two 
subissues (juice and peel) and then trade off. To 
accomplish this, actors have to exchange accurate 
information on their preferences, which those in 
conflict are often reluctant to do.7 
In an influential analysis of integrative bar-
gaining, Pruitt (1981, 1983) sets forth five ways for 
bargainers to move from distributive (compromise) 
to integrative (problem solving) forms of negotia-
tion. The most basic strategy is "logrolling," defined 
as a trade-off or exchange across two or more 
issues in which each actor receives a good agree-
ment on his/her higher-priority issue at the expense of 
a poor agreement on his/her lower-priority issue. 
Logrolling is common in negotiations involving a 
large number of complex issues facing actors in the 
same organization or group (Neale and Bazerman 
1991). 
Some of the other strategies overlap with log-
rolling. A "bridging" strategy redefines an issue, 
revealing a new option that satisfies actors' most 
valued goals. Bridging requires actors to analyze 
and set priorities among the interests producing 
their current demands and to eliminate less impor-
tant ones. It can lead to the decomposition of a 
single issue into components, the initial step to-
ward logrolling in the example of two persons ar-
guing over an orange. 
In "nonspecific compensation" one actor com-
mits future compensation to another in exchange 
for concessions on the issues currently under nego-
tiation. For example, in exchange for ending a 
prison riot, prison authorities might agree to form a 
joint committee of prisoners and guards to propose 
changes in policies and procedures. Solutions to 
intense public conflicts often arrange "face-saving" 
devices involving nonspecific compensation of vari-
ous sorts, with the specifics to be worked out later. 
A related strategy, "cost cutting" involves specific 
compensation for the cost one actor incurs as a 
result of an agreed-upon solution. Finally, "expand-
ing the pie" involves, for example, planting an orange 
tree in the above example. This is tantamount to 
adding a constant to the payoffs along the distribu-
tive contract zone. If workers in a subunit negotiate 
for more discretion over how they accomplish their 
tasks, the local managers can spend less time on 
supervision and more time on planning and other 
activities that raise their own prospects for promo-
tion (Kanter 1977). In developing explicit under-
standings about who is responsible for what, both 
workers and managers might "win" by expanding 
the "total control" pie (Tannenbaum 1968). 
In reviews of research on integrative bargain-
ing, Pruitt (1981; Pruitt and Lewis 1977) suggests 
that integrative agreements are more likely if actors 
consider multiple issues simultaneously rather than 
sequentially, because package deals (trade-offs) are 
more salient and easier to arrange. A mutual prob-
lem-solving orientation also is important, because 
parties are more likely to exchange detailed infor-
mation about their intentions and priorities under 
such conditions. Lower accountability to constitu-
ents allows representatives the flexibility and 
autonomy to exchange information as necessary 
CHAPTER 9 Bargaining and Influence in Conflict Situations 251 
and to make other strategic adjustments at the bar-
gaining table (Carnevale 1985, 1989). Pruitt (1983) 
also suggests that actors who adopt a firm but 
flexible bargaining stance are likely to come clos-
est to reaching whatever integrative potential is 
available in the context. 
Negotiator Heuristics 
Finding integrative solutions that are structured 
into the context may require actors to penetrate 
beneath the surface features of the issues under 
negotiation. The need for more "cognitive work" 
raises the question of how judgment heuristics 
shape or bias an individual's cognitions. Bazerman 
and associates recently applied ideas from the heu-
ristics literature (Kahneman, Slovic, ancf Tversky 
1982) to the individual negotiator as decision maker 
(e.g., Bazerman and Neale 1983; Neale, Huber, and 
Northcraft 1987; Neale and Bazerman 1991; Thomp-
son and Hastie 1990). They focus on four cognitive 
heuristics: framing, anchoring, availability, and 
overconfidence (Neale and Bazerman 1991). 
Framing refers to whether the negotiator inter-
prets variations in payoffs in terms of losses or 
gains. In a labor-management dispute, negotiators 
could regard the other's concession as a loss from 
what they would like to get or as a gain, using the 
opponent's previous offer or the current contract as 
a reference point. The hypothesis is that interpret-
ing payoff variations in terms of losses leads the 
negotiator to take more risks in bargaining (i.e., 
risk seeking), while interpreting it as a gain leads 
the actor to be risk-averse. 
Positively framed actors should be more con-
ciliatory and negatively framed actors more hostile 
and competitive. Several studies support this hy-
pothesis. Neale and Bazerman (1985) examined 
the impact of framing in collective bargaining and 
report that actors with a positive frame made more 
concessions, reached more agreements, and per-
ceived the bargaining outcomes as more fair than 
did those with a negative frame. Bazerman et al. 
(1985) found that positively framed negotiators 
made more profit than negatively framed negotia-
tors. Framing clearly affects the prospects of re-
solving conflict. 
Anchoring occurs when people use informa-
tion at hand as a reference point to estimate values 
for other events. Neale and Bazerman (1991) indi-
cate that goals impact bargainers in part as cogni-
tive anchors and suggest goal difficulty as an im-
portant factor. Huber and Neale (1986) examined 
the connection between the difficulty of a goal set 
initially by a constituent and the difficulty of sub-
sequent self-determined goals. They found that ne-
gotiators who were assigned difficult goals by con-
stituents achieved more integrative agreements. 
The availability bias refers to errors in estimat-
ing the frequency of an event and is affected by the 
degree to which the information is vivid or easy to 
recall. One implication is that negotiation out-
comes are affected by the presentation of informa-
tion. For example, if the costs of nonagreement are 
made personally relevant, negotiators are slower to 
settle, but if the costs of third-party intervention are 
made salient, negotiators are quicker to settle (see 
Neale and Bazerman 1991). Finally, overconfi-
dence biases are reflected in the fact that actors 
tend to overestimate probabilities of good out-
comes or positive performance (Bazerman and 
Neale 1983). 
Explicit-integrative bargaining presupposes a 
structure that creates underlying common goals 
and facilitates open communication to resolve dif-
ferences when they arise. In such contexts, actors 
mutually acknowledge a conflict and have issues 
that can be interrelated or reshaped. In explicit-in-
tegrative bargaining, offers and counteroffers are 
part of an effort to share information about priori-
ties, but various cognitive heuristics can impede 
the process of conflict resolution. 
CONCLUSION 
Bargaining and negotiation is an interdisciplinary 
area in which psychologists, mathematicians, econ-
omists, political scientists, and sociologists have 
made a mark. Each discipline approaches the phe-
nomenon of bargaining from a distinct metatheory— 
a unique set of concepts, assumptions, and theoreti-
cal questions—and each generates research based 
in part on metatheories about the phenomenon and 
how to study it. One result is that the bargaining 
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literature contains a rich mix of theoretical ap-
proaches and research strategies; another is that it 
has some frustrating ambiguities, gaps, and incon-
sistencies. 
We focused here on one part of the literature, 
the social psychological tradition, and have taken a 
sociological perspective that highlights the social-
structural context of bargaining. The fourfold clas-
sification of bargaining contexts presented here is 
based on the distinctions between tacit versus ex-
plicit and distributive versus integrative bargaining 
(Bacharach and Lawler 1980; Schelling 1960; Wal-
ton and McKersie 1965). Each social context has 
structural and cognitive dimensions, and each is 
likely to develop out of the conjoint effects of the 
social structure, actors' definition of their relation-
ship, and their tactical action. Explicit bargaining is 
possible only where the social structure allows 
open communication between the actors and they 
choose to deal directly and explicitly with a con-
flict. Integrative bargaining is possible only where 
the social structure creates sufficient overriding 
common interest and the actors perceive and choose 
to act on these common interests. The typology has 
the heuristic advantage of subsuming and organiz-
ing a vast range of research literature on bargain-
ing; it pulls together disparate threads. 
Different theoretical traditions (e.g., symbolic 
interaction, social exchange theory, cognitive the-
ory, game theory) focus on and assume different 
types of bargaining contexts. For the most part, 
these theoretical perspectives complement each 
other. One way sociologists can contribute is by 
specifying and elaborating the structural aspects of 
bargaining contexts and showing how these shape 
bargaining processes (e.g., actors' definitions of 
the situation, tactical choices) and the prospects for 
conflict resolution. The precise nature of problems 
actors face is different across contexts, as are the 
NOTES 
1. A common theme of the definitions is that bargaining 
involves a process of exchanging demands, bids, or of-
fers, while negotiation is either the broader social inter-
action or relationship within which such exchange takes 
tactical options available and the prerequisites of 
conflict resolution. Future work should attempt to 
distinguish theoretical principles that apply across 
contexts from those that are context-specific. 
There are several promising directions for fu-
ture work. First, tacit-integrative bargaining war-
rants more systematic attention because it can cap-
ture how people negotiate their way through daily 
conflicts and tensions (see Strauss 1978). Conver-
sational analyses will be useful here. Second, most 
social psychological work on explicit-distributive 
bargaining has been limited to isolated two-party 
bargaining, but recent exchange network and 
power dependence theories place dyads in a larger 
network of relations (e.g., Cook et al. 1983; Mark-
ovsky, Wilier, and Patton 1988). Such work offers 
a structural approach to bargaining, focusing on 
power relations (Lawler 1992), and there is much 
to be done here (see chapter 8). Third, research on 
explicit-integrative contexts has used principles of 
cognitive psychology to understand how cognitive 
biases affect negotiators' decisions. Future efforts 
should address the emotional responses of negotia-
tors and interweave the emotional with the cogni-
tive, because positive and negative frames, for ex-
ample, should have emotional as well as cognitive 
effects on negotiators. Finally, research on tacit-
distributive contexts, as we define it, is voluminous 
but also in need of new direction, because the two-
party matrix game has probably outlived its useful-
ness as a research setting. Issues surrounding the 
social dilemma represent a promising new direc-
tion that ties this form of bargaining to larger socio-
logical questions about the foundation of social 
order (see chapter 12). Overall, social psychologi-
cal work on bargaining and negotiation offers a 
fertile basis for more systematic sociological theo-
rizing about conflict and resolution. 
place (Gulliver 1979; Strauss 1978) or simply efforts to 
transcend the conflict and promote more cooperative 
decision making (Morley and Stephenson 1977; Pruitt 
1981). Our definition of bargaining, taken from Schelling 
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(1960) and Bacharach and Lawler (1980, 1981), distin-
guishes it from conflict but not negotiation. 
2. In Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) terms, actors in each 
bargaining context have significant degrees of fate con-
trol and behavioral control over each other. The former 
encourages them to bargain and the latter encourages 
them to attend to each other's behavior. 
3. The line of research by Linda Molm on social ex-
change exemplifies a nonbargaining context (Molm 
1987, 1989, 1990), although the setting contains some 
elements of what we call a tacit-integrative context. 
4. We acknowledge that game theories provide funda-
mental theoretical analyses that apply to all forms of 
two-party bargaining (Rapoport 1966). Our point here is 
simply that taking the conditions assumed by game theo-
retical models as a whole (e.g., simultaneous choices 
involving two options—cooperation versus competi-
tion—and no verbal communication), the research based 
on these models is directed primarily at the tacit-dis-
tributive cell of our typology. 
5. Compared to a chicken setting, actors in a prisoner's 
dilemma find it more difficult to avoid conflict spirals 
and require more safeguards (i.e., monitoring) to move 
from a pattern of mutual competition to mutual coopera-
tion. Solutions often require sanction systems, punishing 
competition or rewarding cooperation to such an extent 
that the original prisoner's dilemma is transformed into 
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